So Germany has almost got a new government. “Almost”, because a referendum among the members of the Social Democratic party (SPD) could still derail the Groko, the Grosse Koalition with chancellor Angela Merkel’s Christian Democrats (CDU) and their Bavarian sister party, the CSU. And don’t bank on that not happening. Politics used to be top-down thing in Germany. Not any more.
Having said that, the Social Democrats would have to be stupid to refuse the deal. Consider this: in last September’s general election, they went down to historical defeat. As of writing, they are polling a risible 18% or so, not much more than the far-right newcomer Alternative für Deutschland (AfD).
Now you can argue that this is precisely because the SPD has been in government for so long – since 1998, with a break of only four years between 2009 and 2013 – and that a spell in opposition would do it good. And this is what the SPD’s youth organisation wants. They gaze with envy at Jeremy Corbyn’s populist appeal and dream of a rejuvenated party with a hard-left approach winning big in 2021 or 2025 and giving them lots of career opportunities, maybe in a coalition with the Greens and the radical Left party.
If I were a budding career politician in the SPD, I might think the same way. But for the present middle-aged leadership, four to eight years in opposition watching the rise of a new generation is hardly an attractive option. And there is no guarantee that moving to the left will do the SPD any good. That ground is already occupied by the Left party.
What’s more, the SPD’s soon to be ex-leader Martin Schulz has managed to snatch victory from the jaws of defeat (and from his own fit of pique on election night when he vowed that the party would go into opposition). The new coalition agreement has a decidedly social-democratic flavour. And the SPD gets the treasury, which Merkel’s tight-fisted henchman Wolfgang Schäuble used to scuttle ambitious plans in Germany and to throttle Europe in the name of financial discipline. They’re breaking out the champagne in the Élysée and the Berlaymont.
Indeed, the loser in the poker game of the past weeks and months is Merkel. The only party that honestly wanted to govern with her were the Greens. The liberal Free Democrats (FDP) walked out of negotiations, and the SPD had to be enticed back with a deal that leaves Merkel’s own party without a single key ministry. Horst Seehofer, who is being forced out of his office as prime minister of Bavaria by his own party, the CSU, is being rewarded for his constant sniping at Merkel’s refugee policy with the thankless job of interior minister, where he can take responsibility for future terror attacks.
Everyone expects the chancellor to leave in the middle of her term and hand over to a successor. As the leader of a so-called Jamaica coalition between the Christian Democrats, the FDP and the Greens, she might have gained a new lease of life. As the leader of her third Groko, she looks tired. The concessions she has made to the SPD give superficial credence to the claims of the AfD that it is the only truly conservative force in the country and that it has stepped into the shoes abandoned by the CDU under Merkel.
This isn’t true. The populist AfD is anti-globalist, Eurosceptic and Russophile, all of which the CDU never was. But if the AfD can avoid further self-radicalisation, scandals and personal vendettas (which doesn’t seem likely), it might be able to break the current mould of German politics and form a coalition with a post-Merkel CDU/CSU, which is sure to tack to the right. Think the Austrian model: 2021 could see a revitalised right re-energising the moribund left, and a return to what the Germans call “Lagerpolitik”, the politics of opposing ideological camps. Not necessarily the worst thing that could happen, by the way.
For the moment, however, and assuming the SPD referendum doesn’t chuck a spanner in the works, it’s Merkel and the Groko. What does this mean for Europe and Britain? Martin Schulz will be foreign minister. As ex-president of the European parliament he is as Europhile as they come. Indeed, he recently proposed aiming for the “United States of Europe” by 2025. These are not empty words. Schulz is an idealist, and this is probably his last chance at real politics. Emmanuel Macron could not have a more fervent – and impatient – ally. So expect to see the euro area become more integrated, possibly with its own finance minister and minister for economic development. Expect more funds to assist the ailing economies in the south, maybe eurobonds or similar forms of debt mutualisation.
Given the resistance of the Visegrad group – Poland, Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic – to further European integration, Schulz could see himself faced with a serious European split within months of taking office. But don’t expect him to give up on his integrationist ideas or to soften his stance on Brexit.
He believes that restarting the German-French “motor” and reviving the eurozone will exert a pull on the peoples of the Visegrad states, who will, sooner or later, throw out their nationalist governments. And if not, he wants Brexit to prove to the pesky Hungarians, Poles, Slovaks and Czechs that leaving the EU is not a cosy option.
So, does the same old coalition mean more of the same old politics? I doubt it. Things are hotting up.